The reconstruction forces in Afghanistan should increase financial and military support to local militias in order to combat the Taliban offensive

18Karl

FRAMEWORK:

This is a policy debate. It advocates for the change in the status quo of supporting the Afghan National Army to supporting the less known local militias and paramilitaries. The aim of reconstruction is to ensure the following: that (a) the Taliban does not retake power in the said areas, (b) Afghanistan has a stable system of governance, and (c) that Afghanistan has a stable economy.

DEF:

Financial Support-Support in terms of monetary means; funding

Military Support-Support in terms of military means, can be both indirect and direct

Local Militias-Local armed men who are not soldiers, but take defense into their own hands (Arbakai, ALP)

The Proposal:

1. To sustain the rate of financial support from the International Community to Afghanistan ($13 billion/yearly) [1]
   
2. To redirect 60-70% ($5.8 billion) of foreign military financial support to arming local militias and providing them training with weapons
   
3. To dispatch both Afghan National Army and ISAF specialists to train local militias to fight the Taliban
   
4. To sustain the amount of American troops in Afghanistan (10,800) [2]
   
5. To increase the number of non-combat personnel (like non-combative military doctors) in Afghanistan and to withdraw all combat related troops
   
6. To reorganize, regroup and reform (and possibly expand) current existing militias, like the Afghan Local Police and to possibly revive the Arbaki local village defense systems (upon these point, possibly combining ALP with the Arbaki is also included)
   

The Status Quo of Situation

a.) ANA

The Afghan National Army (ANA) is one of the two armies trained and equipped by the US (the other one being Iraq). We can see, as in the case of Iraq, that the cowardly actions of the Iraqi Army during the Anbar Offensive have proven that US training has been a complete and utter failure, due to the corrupt nature of the Baghdad government. Is the case in Afghanistan any different? I argue that it is not so: perhaps the Afghan Army is even less prepared for a Taliban offensive than the Iraqi Armies with respect to IS. The first problem with the ANA that it is part of a corrupt government; TI lists Afghanistan as being one of the most corrupt nations in the world, and this corruption is present in the Army. [5]This weakening corruption is accompanied by ineffective logistics. As of 2012, the United States has transferred only two to three categories of logistical transport to ANA officers, and even now they saw problems. Senior ANA officers were trained using the Soviet “push” model, which was counter-effective to the “pull” model which led to the spontaneous generation of the ANA. [4]

b.) ALP

The ALP (the Afghan Local Police) was a militia created in the early invasion days by the “Reconstruction Forces”. The ALP has been called a human-rights violating militia by the Human Rights Watch, stating that “instead of rushing to triple the size of the Afghan Local Police, the US and Afghan governments should be adopting mechanisms to ensure these forces abide by the law”. Since several green-on-blue incidents in 2008, the ALP’s expansion has been wholly halted by the “Reconstruction Forces”. Currently, it now only occupies 25% of the nation’s 400 districts, although expansion for the force is planned. The main issues with the ALP is the following: that it is often overlooked, underestimated, and needs huge reforms. Accordingly to HRW (Human Rights Watch), the ALP needed “more adequate resources, including additional personnel, in order to investigate complaints”, supported by “ensuring that all recruits are individually vetted” via a process that “checks for past allegations of human rights abuses” in order for it’s expansion to be successful. [5]

Why Militias?

No one system is perfect, but in this, we are choosing between the value of two organizations. I shall make the argument clear here upon the following basis: that as long as the insurgency continues, increased support for militias financially and militarily will serve Afghanistan better than a central army.

a.) Locality

This case will be based upon the traditional mistrust between tribes in Afghanistan, and how the ANA is already being deprived of it’s full capabilities upon these grounds. The ANA’s officer corps is governed by strict racial quotas that attempt to “reflect the nation’s ethnic composition”. I wholly argue that this wholly deters the operational capabilities of the ANA. Firstly, it deters the operational capabilities of one based on race. Many Afghans complain that these ethnic quotas are similar to affirmative action for the oppressed Northern minorities. However, that is the least of it’s worries: for now, one could ensure that the ethnic composition of the ANA is worrying. The UN estimates that 70% of Kandaks (Brigades) are controlled by Tajiks. It is very hard indeed to see the racial “quotas” filled in the Afghan Army.

There are many racial tensions that exists between the many ethnic groups in Afghanistan. These racial tensions date back many years, but were intensified by the Taliban’s Pashto Supremacist ideals. Accordingly to a Tajik lieutenant: "We can be here in the Pashtun area for 1,000 years, but they will never be our friends”. The army is made up of mostly Northern ethnic minorities, mainly Tajiks, but also some Hazaras and Uzbeks, who, under the Taliban Regime, were prosecuted. The alienation between the Northern and the Southern Afghan lies not only in age-old historical disputes. Accordingly, “in southern Afghanistan, the focus of the U.S. war effort, nearly all the Afghan soldiers are foreigners too…most don’t even speak the local language”. Accordingly to US specialists, “the more Dari, the language spoken by Tajiks, becomes the de facto language of the ANA, the more Pashtuns will see it as an alien institution”, highlighting the massive differences between the Dari dialect and the Pashto dialect. Efforts to contain an insurgency on these grounds have from a centralized army will result in disaster after disaster: racial tensions are too high upon these grounds. [3,6]

The difference between militias and the national Army is the following: that militias, such as the ALP and the Arbaki Village Defense system’s ethnic composition would be relative to the area that the militia is stationed in. This means, of course, the decentralization of the Afghan Local Police from the Tajik-dominated Ministry of Interior, but if this were to go through, counter-insurgency would become much easier. “To defeat an insurgency, one must become the insurgency”: The Pashtuns, who make up huge swathes of the Taliban’s fighters, must be made to trust the representatives of the government, or at least, distrust the Taliban. This is only done true governmental support of local militias, who have the support of the village-based Jirga. Until this is done, it is doubtful that the Pashtuns would even offer any drop of sympathy for the Afghan government. This idea should not only be applied in the Southern Pashto-dominated areas, but in the Northern areas where Tajiks and Hazaras also live. With this, I believe, we could avoid much racial tensions that would eventually result from the racial conflicts that are present in the ANA. [7]

Historically, this is the most effective way of countering and destroying insurgencies: during the Malaya Insurgency, it was only due to the support of the British support of Malayan units to counter the Communist rebels that Malaysia was saved from the wrathful hands of communism. But history is filled with examples of this serving as an effective way to counter insurgencies, or rebellions: during the Mau Mau Rebellion, it would have been doubtful that Britain would have won without the help of British-funded local loyalists. Even if we were to go back to the many failed separatist movements, it was only due to the support of locals that these movements been eradicated.

In conclusion, we have proven, hopefully, that: (a) the Tajik-dominated army has incited more Pashtuns to turn to the Taliban for solutions, (b) that the Arbakis would be based upon a village-type democracy, and henceforth would not create a feeling of “foreign domination, and (c) the funding of militias in countries have been effective due to locality.

b.) Effectiveness of Logistics

As described, the ANA suffers from huge logistics problems. These logistics problem range from missing guns to slow response. However, there are many factors that led to these failures: a centralized control system in a population which had less than 10% literacy rate, which used the “push” system of ration supply rather than the “pull” method. Let us analyst the effects of this on the effectiveness of the Afghan National Army.

Starting with centralization, every request has to go from the “bottom to the top” in this form. “The GSG4, the Chief of the General Staff, and even the Minister of Defense himself would have to sign authorization documents.” This is very dangerous, for most battles in Afghanistan are not long-drawn battles (where the Soviet “push” model would have been very effective) but short skirmishes. The nature of warfare had changed: the Soviet “push” model was designed for “deep operational warfare”. This is not the guerrilla warfare in which the Afghan National Army fought in daily. However, the nature of this system is very unlikely to be replaced, taken into consideration that most ANA middle-officer (lieutenants etc.) have differing cultural concepts from the Americans. They are willing to take the “easy-option”, in this case, they take what “they are familiar with”. On a wholly opposite note, the militia is not an army: a militia is always stationed in a village, and the need for logistics is self-contained within the village. All this riff-raffle of the ANA is wholly avoided.

There are many more problems about the Afghan logistics, and this is mainly corruption and ineffectiveness. Supply depot officers rate their supplies by the amount of equipment in the depot: this leads to many instances of supplies being refused and ignored on the basis that the supply “depots” need to be filled. Only 1/5 of all requests are satisfied. With this ineffectiveness comes the notion that units do not really need what is supplied: for verification to be possible, up to twelve signatures have to be signed. This deters and slows the already flawed logistics system of the Afghan National Army. The militia counterplea is basically the following: militia members are armed with small arms 24/7, and do not take part in fighting and pursuing the enemy after an attack. Militias are via nature defensive forces.

However, one may further ask how “tackling the militias” would help Afghanistan? Why not just tackle the Afghan officers? The simple statement of a stubborn Afghan middle-officer tells us all: “Okay, we will do what the coalition wants, but when you leave, we are going back to the way we used to do it” The Afghans simply do not want to change; they go for easy first. The Army is plagued with these issues, yet no solution has been founded. I believe that via the arming of the ALP and Arbrakai, that the problems faced in the ANA’s complex logistics system can be solved and wholly avoided. [8,4]

Reform Suggestions:

Here, I shall end my case with several suggestions for the ALP and other militia’s reformation.

a.) Vetting Process and Training

The ALP has been ravaged by a lack of vetting processes, and lack even more training. The ALP are described as “villagers with an AK-47”, often looting and murdering in the process. This is the most common criticism of the ALP: that they represent nothing more than a lawless mob. However, this is only true for ALP units set up by the Reconstruction Forces and local ANA commanders. ALP has been highly successful, however, “in Marjah, Nad Ali, Nawah, Garmsir, Gereshk, Musa Qala, and Sangin districts of Helmand province”, but not in provinces where the ALP has been set up by US forces. Via this vetting and further training,I believe that the ALP will become a civilized militia in no time, in turn defeating the insurgency. But one may ask: “why not the army?” The army is political: it’s conduct is highly tied with the politics of Kabul. The militias are defensives: it’s conduct is not tied with what the President says. This vetting training process would be perhaps unneeded in Arbakai militias, but training is a definite must: the fatality in the ALP is 10%, the highest in all of the militias fighting in Afghanistan.

b.) Plan for Charge/Discharge

The militias cannot be permanent.There must be a plan for when the militias are to form and when they are to be discharged: in this regards, the village elders must work with the Kabul-government in commanding the militias of their respective villages. For if not, they could become what the ALP is today: a lawless brigand of civilians with AKs. This plan for commission and discharge must come, however, only when the United States and Afghanistan has declared the situation to be safe for all citizens.

c.) Impartiality of Laws

These militias cannot be extrajudicial. It is because of this concept that these militias are extrajudicial, that these militias are now roaming around: one may of course reply that the Army should be supported upon these basis. However, the ANA is de jure intrajudicial, but de facto, it is “the law”. “Afghans describe recent incidents in which international forces and/or Afghan forces engaged in abusive treatment, unnecessarily destroying property and disrespecting cultural norms during house searches.”  This is because the Army is a political figure, whilst the militia is not a political figure: if we were to impose Afghan laws upon these Afghan militias, then the need for the ANA would necessarily go down.

IN CONCLUSION:

The ANA is wholly ravaged by issues, such as race and logistics, that could be easily solved by the increase in financial and military support from the “Reconstruction Forces” to the various militias, after of course, a period of militia reform: these reforms include, as suggested above, a more efficient vetting process, a plan for charge/discharge, and an impartiality in respects of the representation of the law. 

I would like to hold the resolution affirmed.

Citations:

[1] http://time.com/43836/afghanistan-is-the-big-winner-in-u-s-foreign-aid/

[2] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ISAF_troop_number_statistics

[3] http://www.nbcnews.com/id/38432732/ns/world_news-south_and_central_asia/t/afghan-army-struggles-ethnic-divisions/#.VK0kA4qUfxg

[4] http://www.dodig.mil/pubs/documents/DODIG-2015-047.pdf

[5] http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/afghanistan0911webwcover.pdf

[6] http://original.antiwar.com/porter/2009/11/28/tajik-grip-on-afghan-army-signals-new-ethnic-war/

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